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TEXTILES AND TRADE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN
WILLIAM B. HAUSER
Department of History, University of Rochester,
Rochester, NY 14627
INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of the textile trade in Tokugawa
Japan (1600-1867) requires that the socio-economic and
political context first be outlined. Japan was a state
divided into many separated political jurisdictions,
with around one-quarter of the country controlled
directly by the Tokugawa Shogunate and the other
three-quarters under the local control of around 265
local barons or daimyo. While each of these local
power-holders was subordinated to the shogun and re-
quired to spend half his time in attendance on the
shogun at the Tokugawa capital of Edo (modern Tokyo),
within his own domain he was an autonomous ruler. Each
daimyo owed fealty to the Tokugawa, but they paid no
taxes and were left alone so long as they were not
abusing the residents of their domains. Tokugawa power
was centered in the Kanto plain around Edo but in-
cluded direct control of the major cities of Edo,
Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagasaki as well as the foreign
trade conducted out of Nagasaki with Dutch and Chinese
merchants.
Major features of the Tokugawa era were domestic
peace, following a century of warfare in the battles
for unification before 1615; the political integration
of the country through the system of alternate at-
tendance required of the daimyo; urbanization; and
economic growth together with greatly expanded demands
for consumer goods. As a consequence of urbanization
and the withdrawal of most samurai from the villages
into the cities, the agrarian model of society with a
clear separation between warrior-bureaucrats and
aristocrats at the top of society and farmers,
artisans and merchants supplying their needs broke
down. Over the course of the Tokugawa era, increased
commercial agriculture and by-employment activities by
farmers blurred the distinctions between handicraft
industries and trade, on the one hand, and farming, on
the other. This had a major impact on the textile
trade in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
While largely secluded from the outside world,
Tokugawa society was by no means static and unchang-
ing. Between 1600 and 1867 the economy became in-
creasingly monetized and commercialized, farming
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shifted from subsistence to market oriented cropping
patterns, and new systems of production and distribu-
tion developed. In the seventeenth century Kyoto and
Osaka were the primary foci of commercial activity.
The Kinki region surrounding the imperial capital of
Kyoto and Osaka had long been the center of the Japa-
nese economy and of handicraft industrial production.
While Kyoto was the center of silk textile production,
Osaka became a center for the cotton trade. When cot-
ton cultivation and processing expanded in the six-
teenth century, the Kinki region was of major impor-
tance.
THE COTTON TRADE
By the early seventeenth century cotton had replaced
linen as the staple fiber for Japanese commoner clo-
thing. Cotton became a major commercial crop in the
Osaka region and Osaka and nearby market towns devel-
oped as cotton processing centers. By the end of the
seventeenth century merchant and artisan guilds devel-
oped to focus the marketing and processing of seed
cotton into cloth on the city of Osaka. Protective
trade associations or kabunakama were designed to reg-
ularize business procedures and trade routes and con-
trol access to the cotton trade. On the one hand
guilds assured consistent quality and prices for cot-
ton goods; helped define roles in the collecting, pro-
cessing, and distribution of seed and ginned cotton,
cotton yarn, and cotton cloth; and brought order to a
complex system of economic relationships. On the other
hand, once established the guilds limited innovation,
restricted access, and monopolized various aspects of
the processing and marketing of cotton and cotton tex-
tiles. In the 1660s and 1670s the Osaka city
magistrates authorized guilds for cotton buying, ship-
ping, processing and sales. The guilds helped stabi-
lize the cotton trade, assisted government control of
commerce, and helped preserve the separation between
cotton cultivators and those who processed and
marketed their crops. In a context in which handicraft
industry and trade were seen as potential contaminants
of the purity of self-sufficient agricultural vil-
lages, the kabunakama in the cotton trade were impor-
tant for preserving the separation of commerce and ag-
riculture. They also assured that regular supplies of
cotton would be available for the urban residents of
Osaka and, to a lesser extent, Edo.
As cotton cultivation became increasingly common as
a cash crop in Kinki area villages, cotton processing
also increased. Initially villagers processed enough
cotton to provide cloth for household consumption. But
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from the 1730s on, cotton cultivating villages in-
creased the volume of processed goods they produced.
This was especially true for cotton ginning and the
dominant position of Osaka cotton ginners was chal-
lenged. Local cloth production increased as well and
this threatened the position of the Osaka cotton
weavers. The Osaka guilds of seed and ginned cotton
dealers, processors and shippers declined in influence
and appealed to the city government for protection. In
1772 the Osaka city government ordered all those com-
peting with the Osaka cotton guilds to join them and
abide by their regulations. The city government
stepped in to reinforce the position of the Osaka cot-
ton guilds. In doing so, the city government demanded
new monetary contributions from the guild members, and
these licensing fees strengthened ties between the
cotton merchants and the city administration.
Similar actions were taken to defend the interests
of the guilds of cotton cloth merchants. During the
1770s and 1780s, they too formed revised trade associ-
ations in association with the Osaka city government.
Included were the Osaka cotton cloth wholesalers
nakama fmomen ton'y_a nakama) and the Osaka cotton
cloth dealers nakama (nanakumi momen'ya nakama). The
cloth wholesalers purchased cotton cloth and sold it
to the cloth dealers for storage and distribution.
While a licensed monopoly the wholesalers guild of-
fered to admit any newcomers who could afford its li-
cense fees and wished to enter the trade. The cotton
dealers guild included merchants who warehoused and
shipped cotton cloth to Edo and other areas of Japan
as well as local retailers. Each of its seven member
groups had long histories, with the Edo shippers asso-
ciation dating back to 1616.
The reinforced kabunakama served several purposes.
First, they enhanced the cotton merchants access to
the juridical power of the city administration to pro-
tect them from outside competition. Second, they in-
tensified the pressures on guild members to adhere to
established business practices and limited the ability
of guild members to innovate. Third, they provided a
new source of revenues—through licensing fees—to the
city government. Finally, they helped insure the
stability of the cotton trade and the supply of cotton
goods to the city. Severe penalties including threats
of fines or expulsion from the trade helped keep mem-
bers in line and retarded changes in the operation of
the Osaka cotton trade. While prior to the 1770s
guilds had defined spheres of activity and regulated
the Osaka cotton trade, by the 1770s more formal me-
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chanisms with closer ties to government power were re-
quired. Reorganized kabunakama protected the interests
of the Osaka cotton merchants. Direct sales by rural
cotton producers, new marketing and distribution
strategies by rural jobbers and transport merchants,
and increased rural processing of cotton collectively
weakened the dominant position of the "Osaka guild mer-
chants in the cotton trade. Kabunakama formation in
the 1770s and 1780s served to reassert Osaka merchant
controls and limit the expansion of rural processing
and trade.3
Village processors and merchants were not the only
sources of competition for the Osaka cotton merchants.
Local daimyo also worked to augment their incomes from
the cotton trade. In 1785, Wakayama domain tried to
established a ginned cotton buying office in Osaka to
improve access to supplies for its domain sponsored
reeled yarn industry- The domain tried to evade the
Osaka guild system and buy directly from ginned cotton
shippers in Osaka. The Osaka guild merchants protested
to the city government that this violated their
monopoly rights and Wakayama domain was forced to fol-
low established market procedures. The city government
protected the cotton merchants' interests against an
encroachment by Wakayama domain.4
A more serious domain challenge came in 1821. Himeji
domain established a domain monopoly for marketing its
bleached cotton cloth and omitted the Osaka cotton
cloth merchants. Until 1821, all Himeji cloth exports
passed through the Osaka cloth merchants and the new
domain monopoly abruptly altered the marketing system.
The new monopoly increased domain revenues from cotton
exports. By shipping cloth directly to the higher
priced Edo market, all profits went directly into the
domain treasury and the Osaka merchants were excluded.
The impact of this and other challenges to the Osaka
cotton merchants was dramatic. White cotton cloth im-
ports to Osaka declined from 8 million tan (12 yard
bolt of cloth suitable for one garment) in 1810 to an
average of 3 million tan between 1832 and 1841. At the
same time the price of cloth increased in Osaka by 50
per cent, even though cloth production in Himeji and
elsewhere increased. The dominant position of the
Osaka cloth merchants in the Kinki cotton trade was
shattered.5
Rural competition and challenges to the dominant
position of the Osaka cotton merchants continued from
the mid-eighteenth century. For example, northeast of
the city of Sakai near the modern city of Yao were
-116-
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three groups of rural cotton cloth traders. All were
formally organized by the 1750s, had established busi-
ness regulations and attempted to limit outside compe-
tition. Yet their regulations illustrate the problems
they faced in controlling the rural cotton cloth
trade. Admonitions against roadside sales and under-
the-counter transactions suggest both were common.
Members competed for cloth supplies as evident from
the effort to discourage such practices. One member of
the Yao cotton cloth traders guild was Wataya
Kichibei, whose shop Watakichi was a large-scale
trader of cotton cloth, ginned cotton, cotton yarn,
and other dry goods from the 1750s into the twentieth
century. In 1759, for example, Watakichi sold 21,428
bolts of white and striped cotton cloth, 1720 spools
of cotton yarn, and 273 kan (8.72 Ibs.) of ginned cot-
ton. Originally a seed cotton dealer, in the 1750s
Watakichi became a major cloth wholesaler. Sales fluc-
tuated from year to year with 52,178 bolts sold in
1826, 33,676 bolts sold in 1852, a high of 79,275
bolts sold in 1864 and only 35,297 in 1868. Documents
which survive indicate that Watakichi sold directly to
merchants from Omi and did not go through the Osaka
cloth traders guilds on route. While Watakichi was one
of the larger rural cloth merchants, he was not unique
in his independence from the Osaka cotton guilds. It
was this kind of competition in the 1760s and 1770s
that encouraged the Osaka merchants to reorganize
their guilds and request additional monopoly rights
from the Osaka city government. As Watakichi il-
lustrates, it was difficult to control competition
outside of the city of Osaka.6
A major transition point in the Osaka cotton trade
occurred in 1823 when 1007 cotton cultivating villages
in Settsu and Kawachi, provinces near the city of
Osaka, complained to the Osaka city magistrate that
the Osaka cotton wholesalers guild was restraining
trade. The guild was accused of disrupting shipments
through Osaka, Sumiyoshi, Sakai, and Nada and con-
fiscating goods until it received its normal commis-
sion. This limited the market for village cotton and
enabled the Osaka guild to unilaterally determine the
price of seed cotton. The Osaka guild defended itself
and claimed only to be exercising its long established
rights in the cotton trade. Yet, with 1007 villages
claiming hardship for over 10,000 households of cotton
cultivators, the Osaka city magistrate was faced with
a difficult decision. At issue was continued govern-
ment support for the kabunakama in the Osaka cotton
trade. The suit challenged the commercial policies of
the Tokugawa Shogunate.
I
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In its decision, the government did not deny the
monopoly rights of the Osaka cotton wholesalers guild,
but it sanctioned free trade outside of the city of
Osaka. This set a precedent which reduced the willing-
ness of the Shogunate to interfere in the Kinki cotton
trade. The decision abrogated the responsibility of
the city government to protect the Osaka cotton guilds
from outside competition. While the decision focused
on seed cotton sales, its impact was far greater. Im-
portant legal barriers to structural change in the
Kinki cotton trade disappeared as a result of the 1823
dispute. Thereafter, unrestricted rural trade would
further undermine the position of the Osaka cotton
merchants.7
THE SILK AND LINEN TRADES
Similar changes are evident in the silk and hemp
trades during the Tokugawa era. New cropping patterns,
weaving and spinning technology transfers to new
regions, and the expansion of rural cloth processing
and trade as by-employments challenged the position of
established textile production and marketing systems.
The Kyoto Nishijin silk textile industry is one exam-
ple of this process. Kyoto developed as a center of
silk textile production in the Heian era (794-1185).
The Nishijin district of the city became the center of
silk weaving in the late fifteenth century. By the
mid-sixteen century the weavers guild received both
shogunal and imperial protection as the source of
luxury silks for upper class samurai and court con-
sumption. From the 1590s demand for silk increased
among both samurai and wealthy commoners and Nishijin
weavers flourished. By 1706 there were over 2,000
households of guild weavers in Kyoto.®
Guilds were important both to restrict access to the
weaving trade and assure access to imported yarns from
China. In 1655 the yarn importing guild (Ito wappul
was abolished and fierce competition for reduced sup-
plies of yarn developed in Kyoto. Increased demand and
reduced supplies resulted in rapid yarn price in-
creases which the city government attempted to regu-
late. From the late seventeenth century the Shogunate
encouraged domestic production of silk yarn in north-
ern Japan and the Kanto region. This helped supply the
demands of the Nishijin weavers and eventually re-
placed imported Chinese yarns. At the time of the
great Nishijin fire of 1730, around 7,000 looms were
in operation in Kyoto. The fire destroyed over 3,000
looms and severely affected the Nishijin weaving in-
dustry .
-ns-
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As domestic sericulture expanded so did provincial
silk spinning and weaving. Tango, Kiryu, Nagahama,
Isezaki, Hachioji, Gifu and other areas competed with
the Nishijin silk industry. In the 1730s the superior
looms and weaving technology of the Nishijin weavers
spread to regional production centers. The 1730 fire
accelerated this diffusion as many weavers were dis-
placed from Nishijin and welcomed invitations to
migrate elsewhere. Once rural silk production in-
creased much of the cloth was shipped to Kyoto for
further processing and sale. The Nishijin weavers
quickly challenged this invasion of their primary
market.9
In 1744 the Nishijin weavers petitioned the Kyoto
city magistrates for protection from imports of
provincial textiles. Constraints on silk imports at-
tempted to restrict competition in Kyoto, but the city
government was powerless to control rural production.
A limit of 36,000 tan (12 yd. bolt) of cloth from
Tango and 9,000 tan from Kiryu illustrates the scale
of rural imports. To reinforce their position the
Nishijin weavers in 1745 formed a kabunakama of
takabata (tall loom) weavers, designed to stifle com-
petition from both provincial weavers and outsiders in
the city of Kyoto as well as control the actions of
guild members. Even while this kabunakama was forming
new weavers proliferated in and outside of Kyoto. Ef-
forts to strengthen the weavers guilds in the 1750s
and 1760s illustrate the severity of the competition.
A major fire in 1788 sent more Nishijin weavers to the
provinces as many apprentices left their masters and
became independent. In 1800, a further reorganization
of the kabunakama also failed to stifle outside compe-
tition.1^
In 1816, the weavers guild attempted to stop weavers
from leaving Kyoto and relocating in the provinces.
Despite this and other actions, competition continued
to undermine the position of Nishijin. Kyoto weavers
still produced the finest silk textiles, but rural
competition was a serious threat to the Nishijin silk
industry. In 1833, 1836 and 1837 bad weather
devastated the rice crops and caused severe famine
throughout Japan. The market for silk textiles col-
lapsed and many weavers left the craft. In the pro-
vinces, where weaving was usually a by-employment
rather than a full-time occupation, the recovery of
the weaving industry was more rapid after the famine
ended in 1838 and competition for silk yarn in-
tensified. Silks from Tango, Nagahama, and Kiryu
-119-
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flooded the Kyoto market and destroyed the remnants of
the Nishijin monopoly. The elimination of all guilds
by the Shogunate in 1841 furthered the destruction of
the Kyoto silk industry. The 2219 houses of takabata
weavers were reduced to 1201 households by 1852; 456
of these weavers were new entrants to the craft.
Rural competition had "eliminated the dominant position
of the Nishijin weavers. While the imported Jacguard
loom would help restore the industry in the late nine-
teenth century, silk textile production had spread to
regions far from the control of the Nishijin weavers
and outside the jurisdiction of the Kyoto city govern-
ment or the Tokugawa Shogunate.11
As centers of rural silk weaving proliferated, among
the most important were Tango, Nagahama, and Kiryu.
Let us briefly examine each of them. While the Kiryu
area had a long history of textile production, it was
not nationally important until the mid-Edo period.
Most weaving was concentrated in the Kiryu Shinmachi
area or in the 54 villages which comprised Kiryu
domain, now included in Gunma and Tochigi Prefectures
north of modern Tokyo. Because of poor farm land, silk
and paper production were important sources of sup-
plementary income. By the late Tokugawa era, Kiryu was
the second most important area for silk production
after Nishijin. Sales of Kiryu silk to Edo and Kyoto
date from the 1680s and 1690s. By 1718, seventeen
transport merchants were shipping silk from Kiryu and
in 1722 the Mitsui house opened an Echigoya branch
shop in Kiryu to purchase local textiles. By 1738 lo-
cal weavers used high quality production technology
brought from Kyoto. Kiryu produced both silk twill
cloth and silk yarns. Kiryu silk competed effectively
with Nishijin as both shared common technology and
used similar yarns. Located close to major areas of
silk yarn production and two days from Edo by land or
water, Kiryu could compete with Nishijin in major ur-
ban markets. Because the area was divided administra-
tively into many separate jurisdictions under Tokugawa
bannermen (hatamoto) control, no single authority
could regulate the by-employment activities of local
farmers. This facilitated the rapid expansion of silk
weaving in the area.
In 1731 the market days for Kiryu silk were changed
to help Kiryu Shinmachi develop as a major silk market
in competition with Omama, the dominant market in the
area. The town grew substantially, especially after
the 1738 introduction of takabata looms from Kyoto.
Better looms increased output and weaving quality and
by 1744 Kyoto weavers were complaining about the com-
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petition from Kiryu. Until the 1770s most Kiryu silk
was white cloth, but thereafter dyers appeared in
Kiryu and dyeing increased. Water wheels improved yarn
quality and figured textile production increased after
1786. This made Kiryu silk more comparable to Nishijin
silk and made Kiryu the focal point of the Kanto silk
industry. In the nineteenth century, Kiryu faced
regional competition from Ashikaga and other Kanto
textile centers . Efforts to control competition in
the Kiryu region are evident in 1781, 1797, 1835,
1838, and 1846. Just as Nishijin lost its monopoly to
Kiryu, Kiryu Shinmachi lost its position as the pri-
mary Kanto silk market after 1832 when a rival market
opened in Ashikaga where traders could evade the con-
trols of the Kiryu textile guilds.12
Tango silk crepe (chirimen) was another major source
of competition for the Nishijin weavers. The Kaya val-
ley in Miyazu domain was a silk production region un-
til the seventeenth century when the local daimyo
relocated weavers to the castle town of Miyazu. In
1722, new weaving technology came to the region from
Nishijin and silk crepe production developed as an im-
portant by-employment industry. The closeness of Tango
to Kyoto made access to new weaving technology easier
than in Kiryu, as local merchants regularly travelled
to the imperial capital. Domain authorization of silk
crepe production after 1722 resulted in a rapid in-
crease in the number of looms. The Kaya valley had 205
looms in 1764-71, 423 in 1775, 503 in 1803, and 496 in
1829. By 1803, 956 looms existed outside the castle
town of Miyazu with most weaving concentrated in the
Kaya valley. Weavers in Miyazu domain prospered after
the transfer of silk crepe weaving technology from
Kyoto to Tango. Nearby Mineyama domain also saw ex-
panded weaving.
All Tango silk crepe was shipped to Kyoto for dyeing
and sale. A marketing and distribution system control-
led by Kyoto guild merchants dominated trade and used
advanced payments to weavers to monopolize access to
Tango silk. Kyoto was also a major source of yarn for
Tango weavers. In 1769 Kyoto yarn dealers suspended
provincial yarn sales to protect Nishijin weavers from
excessive rural competition. This policy failed as
rural yarn dealers stepped in to supply the demand and
silk crepe production continued to increase. Competi-
tion in the Tango silk trade developed between Miyazu
castle town merchants and Kyoto merchants, with the
former supported by the domain government, and also
between rural and castle town cloth and yarn traders.
The rural weavers asserted their independence whenever
I
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possible. In 1820 a slump in the silk crepe weaving
industry resulted in an effort by weavers from Miyazu,
Mineyama, and Kumihama domains to collectively
organize an independent organization to represent
their interests in the textile trade. At each level of
production and distribution, Kyoto merchants. Tango
castle town merchants, and provincial weavers asserted
their own interests in the silk trade. This became
particularly intense in the 1820s, just when the Kinki
cotton trade experienced aggressive efforts by rural
merchants and producers to assert their independence
from Osaka guild controls.13
Nagahama silk crepe (chirimen) was another source of
competition for Nishijin silks. The area around modern
Nagahama city in Shiga Prefecture was an important
sericulture and weaving center during the second half
of the Tokugawa era. Nagahama silk production emerged
between 1738 and 1752 as a form of by-employment ac-
tivity in this part of Hikone domain. The local pro-
duct was known as Kama or Nagahama chirimen and was
largely marketed in Kyoto. In the 1750s the Nishijin
weavers objected to imports of Kama chirimen and the
city magistrate supported their objections and banned
Kama chirimen from Kyoto. Hikone merchants turned to
the domain government for support. Discovering that
domain tax goods could be freely sold in Kyoto, the
domain office arranged to sell the cloth through the
domain office in the city. Merchants were appointed to
inspect the cloth for quality and serve as sales
agents for Hikone cloth. In 1763 the Kyoto magistrate
approved the direct marketing of Hikone cloth and pro-
duction of Kama chirimen increased. By 1797 the volume
of cloth shipped to Kyoto was 8,000 to 13,000 rolls
per year. In 1799 the domain ordered that all yarn,
cotton wadding, and cloth produced in the domain as
well as all chirimen be designated as official tax
goods and sent to the Kyoto domain office. This creat-
ed a domain products monopoly in Hikone. Regulations
for chirimen production and sales were revised in 1815
to increase domain profits from the trade. In 1829
Hikone opened a domain products sales office in Edo in
order to avoid paying commissions to Osaka merchants
for transporting and marketing domain goods. In 1857 a
domain products office was opened in Nagahama to cer-
tify the quality of Nagahama silk and reinforce the
dominant position of the domain government in the silk
trade. Hikone domain used its export controls over
Nagahama chirimen as an important source of sup-
plementary income and opened domain products sales of-
fices to compete directly with guild merchants in
Kyoto, Osaka, and Edo.14 Other examples of the chang-
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ing nature of the textile trade in the Kanto region
can be seen in the production and marketing of Gurnna
silk yarns and Maoka cotton cloth. Both prospered in
the early nineteenth century in competition with tex-
tile products from other regions of the country.15
The history of Nara bleached linen (Nara zarashi)
provides an analogy to the Nishijin silk weaving in-
dustry. The Nara area, the dominant source of this
luxury fabric in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
century, developed a highly specialized and tightly
organized system of production and distribution. By
the mid-eighteenth century the system was breaking
down due to both increased independence by rural mer-
chants and artisans and also to competition from other
regions of the country. Like Nishijin silks, Nara
zarashi was dependent on yarn supplies from other
regions as local production was insufficient to meet
the demand from weavers. The Yamato region provided
only 10 to 20 percent of the necessary linen yarns and
80 to 90 percent came from other areas of the country.
Increased linen production in Echigo, Omi, Noto, and
Satsuma competed with Nara zarashi after 1737 and pro-
duction declined from 230,000 bolts (2 tan) in the
1730s to 150,000 bolts in the 1750s, and only around
100,000 bolts in the 1830s. Domain sponsored linen
weaving in hemp cultivating domains enabled lower cost
production and faced the Nara weavers with serious
competition which undermined their dominant posi-
tion.16
CONCLUSIONS
What generalizations can be drawn from the above
discussions of the textile trade in Tokugawa Japan?
First, urbanization increased the demand for textiles
and stimulated production. Second, the importation of
cotton cultivation in the sixteenth century and its
wide diffusion throughout Japan resulted in cotton
displacing linen as the staple fabric for clothing in
the seventeenth century. Third, In the seventeenth
century, both the Tokugawa Shogunate and the regional
daimyo tried to concentrate textile production in
cities and towns and separate handicraft production
from farming. Fourth, urban merchants established an
elaborate network of guilds to regulate the produc-
tion, marketing, and distribution of silk, cotton, and
linen cloth and the raw materials required to produce
them. Fifth, the Shogunate as the national government
and the domain governments in the provinces assisted
the creation of urban merchant monopolies. The timing
of guild formation differed from one area to another,
with Osaka and Kyoto taking the lead in the seven-
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teenth century, but guilds of textile merchants and
artisans are found throughout the primary textile pro-
duction regions by the mid-eighteenth century. Many of
these guilds were reinforced with additional legal
rights in the late-eighteenth century, a symptom of
the increased competition from rural traders and pro-
ducers .
Sixth, a major feature of the textile trade was the
diffusion of cotton, silk, and linen processing tech-
nology and trade away from the cities and into the
provinces. This is especially evident in the Kinki
region around Osaka and Kyoto and the Kanto region
around Edo.17 Provincial merchants competed with those
from the central cities and rural merchants and
artisans competed with those based in urban areas.
This was true in the silk, cotton, and linen trades.
Seventh, a further source of competition was domain
monopolies which by-passed the systems of marketing
and distribution controlled by Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo
merchants. The result of this and other sources of
competition was the decline of urban guild dominance
and of Kinki regional dominance of the textile trades
in the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
Eighth, a major constraint which limited the effec-
tiveness of urban merchant guilds was the lack of
uniform national authority. The Tokugawa Shogunate
controlled Edo, Osaka, and Kyoto and around 25 percent
of Japan's farm land. The rest was divided among 265
daimyo domains, court nobles, and Tokugawa bannermen.
No single authority could impose its will beyond the
limits of its own jurisdiction. The provinces of
Settsu and Kawachi surrounding Osaka and much of the
Kanto region surrounding Edo were divided among many
separate administrative jurisdictions. The authority
of city magistrates was limited beyond the city bor-
ders, and thus they had limited capacity to intervene
on behalf of urban guilds faced with rural competi-
tors. Finally, the economic and social changes experi-
enced by Tokugawa society resulted in many farm
households turning to cash crops and by-employments as
sources of supplementary income. Textile production
and trade were two major areas of involvement. Vil-
lages engaged in sericulture turned to yarn produc-
tion. Those located nearby often turned to weaving.
Cotton growing villages learned to gin and then spin
their seed cotton harvests and others turned to weav-
ing, not just to clothe their families, but to sell
for cash. Income from non-farming activities became a
major source of farm household income throughout
Tokugawa Japan. The distinctions between merchants,
artisans, and farmers blurred as did many of the dis-
-125-
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tinctions between urban and rural patterns of produc-
tion and consumption. Tokugawa Japan was a time of
transition. The textile trades provide a good illus-
tration, of some major features of economic and social
change.
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